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A POLICY PAPER
ON

*IDENTITY-BASED
VIOLENCE PREVENTION
IN
ZAMBIA*

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Introduction

This policy paper[1] is developed as an outcome deliverable following a three-week online training seminar on Identity Based Violence Prevention in Zambia. It was attended by participants from key areas of the government and civil society. This seminar is part of a series of similar programs being conducted in the Great Lakes Region by the Auschwitz Institute for the Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities (AIPG) with assistance from the British People through the UK Aid and Department for International Development DFID. AIPG has in place Memoranda of Understanding with the African Union Commission (AUC), the East African Community (EAC) and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) to collaborate towards building national, regional and sub-regional programs and structures for the prevention of genocide and mass atrocities in their Member States.

Firstly, the paper seeks to bring to the attention of, especially policymakers and implementers factors that account for the history or have the potential to drive identity-based violent conflicts in Zambia. It further highlights legal and policy frameworks that have been adopted to respond to challenges of governance and development in an effort to, among others, counteract the potentially disastrous effects of identity-based violence in the country. Electoral politics, distribution, and access to resources, and the contested foreign influence in the national economy present major risks to stability in the country, where the disenfranchised may seek redress through ethnically mobilized violence. The paper lays out policy recommendations and practices that government, political parties, development partners and civil society can implement towards the institutional and programmatic approaches to prevention.

The paper concludes with a final remark to establish a National Committee for the prevention of genocide and mass atrocities including identity-based violence, as a starting point towards institutionalizing prevention in the country. The committee is consistent with Zambia's membership to the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) under the Pact on Security, Stability, and Development. The protocol on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, War Crimes, and Crimes Against Humanity and all forms of Discrimination contains provisions and functions of such a committee, which also echo the recommendations below.

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1.0 Context

Since its independence in 1964, Zambia has been considered a model of peace and stability in the Southern Africa region. It has generally undergone peaceful transitions between political regimes. Unlike many other countries in the region, Zambia has not been under military coup despite three coup attempts in the past and has not experienced internal strives that could destabilize the country. In fact, before 1990, a period characterized by one-party rule, internal conflicts were non-existent and whenever they occurred, they were promptly quelled using the existing security institutions such as the police and the military.

During the one-party state, Zambia remained relatively stable under the mantra of "*one Zambia, one Nation*" that defined Kaunda's quest for national cohesion. Kaunda propagated national unity through a system of ethnic balancing, by appointing ethnic elites into government, distributed gifts to tribal chiefs, and courting ethnic constituencies to form ethnic coalitions (Ihonvbere, 1996). However, the appointments did not only awaken ethnic consciousness but ended up creating a bloated bureaucracy and entrenched the culture of corruption and impunity in government.

These factors coupled with shrinking political space and economic struggles of the 1980s lead to the agitation for the re-introduction of multiparty politics in 1991. Successive regimes after the reintroduction of multiparty politics continued with a culture of neopatrimonialism that has awakened ethnic identities and resulted in violent confrontations during the electioneering period.

Although ushered in through the wave of multi-party democracy in Zambia, President Chiluba's administration was accused of the democratic space. During the two legislative regimes of his presidency, for example, allegations of a culture of authoritarian rule and neo-patrimonial governance were common. The government enacted restrictive laws to limit activities of civil society organizations (CSOs) and the media. In 1996, the constitution was amended but weakened the powers of the judiciary. It also effectively prevented certain persons from contesting the elections and required persons seeking to hold the Office of President to be of Zambian parentage, which excluded President Kenneth Kaunda since his parents were Malawian nationals. The amendments resulted in an elite fragmentation along ethnic lines that continues to manifest during every election period. For example, after getting into power in 2015, President Edgar Lungu was also accused of perpetuating ethnicity in government by disproportionately appointing people from his ethnic group (Ngoni) into the cabinet and other important positions in the bureaucracy (Habasonda, 2018).

Although other identities such as religion and class manifest in Zambia, ethnic identity is more pronounced. This is mainly attributable to Zambia's multiethnic configuration of its population. While ethnicity on its own does not lead to conflict, it has been instrumentalized thus making it a trigger for identity-based violence in the country. The instrumentalization of ethnicity has tended to dichotomize the Zambian society into "us vs. them". As argued by Staub (2009), if such dichotomization is not addressed, it is not only likely to lead to violent mass actions, but it is likely to degenerate into "pathologically defensive actions against a perceived existential threat".

1.1 Conceptualizing Identity-Based violence

Identity-based conflicts are conflicts where identity (ethnicity, tribe, creed, race, and religions) are used as factors for comparison and mobilization to compete. The concept of identity is expansive and can be linked to the state, national, ethnic, transnational, social, tribal, religious, gender, or individual identity, among others. Identities are either constructed or acquired through interaction (Prins et al. 2015). To understand identity-based violence, several theoretical frameworks can be used. For example, social identity theory helps to understand the influence of identity on violence (Cronin 1999:19-22). The theory has its roots in social psychology and focuses on identification with a social group. It observes that individuals are socially constructed in a group (collectivity) to which they belong and develop conceptual ties through the creation of social identities supported by group solidarity and collective action. This produces a distinction between the "in-group" and the "out-group."

The social identity theory has been used to interrogate ethnic identities in divided societies. In many multiethnic societies, ethnic identity is salient and well pronounced. In this case, understanding ethnicity should not be approached categorically. It is more of a process than an absolute delineation of a specific subsection of a population. When examining ethnicity as a form of identity therefore, there is a need to recognize its diversity, dynamism, plurality, intrinsic qualities, and dependence on social and cultural structures.

In Africa, the position of ethnic identities in managing the state is rooted in colonial politics. Indeed, in much of Africa, the colonial government instrumentalized ethnicity by driving a wedge between ethnic groups as the foundation for the divide-and-rule policy, which gave privileged treatment to some identity groups through preferential treatment and appointments in the colonial offices. Africa's post-colonial states inherited these ethnic stereotypes and divisive patterns of power between and within specific ethnic identities. The manipulation of ethnicity by colonial authorities meant that Africa's post-colonial states emerged with unresolved polarities between different tribal groups and ethnic categories. Mamdani (2002) argues that the ethnicization of politics started with the construction of ethnicity as a divide-and-rule device used for political control.

The end of the Cold War was characterized by a return to the politics of identity and exclusion. Much of Africa, just like in Eastern Europe, the post-Cold War era, witnessed ethnicity increasingly becoming an important factor during intra-state conflicts. The growing political significance of ethnicity is sometimes attributed to authoritarian rule, making way for the revival and fueling of past dissensions among ethnic groups. It is therefore not surprising that ethnic cleavages are increasingly becoming more prominent in Zambia's political and social configurations. Suffice to say, ethnicity is the most important identity that is used to perpetuate various forms of large scale and intercommunal violence. Collier (2001) further avers that ethnic kin groups are the most important levels of social identity.

2.1 Identity Based Violence in Zambia

In Zambia, the element of identity, particularly its ethnic dimension starts to manifest when other significant inequalities are present including skewed access to resources and political opportunities. Other factors that are sources of observable cleavages in Zambia include the urban-rural divide and socio-economic equalities between the rich and the poor. These dichotomies have been amplified by the growing levels of inequalities brought by the burgeoning poverty levels. According to the Zambia Labour Force Survey Report (2018) for example, rural poverty was estimated at 76.6 percent compared to urban poverty at 23.4 percent (Central Statistical Office. 2019). Despite the glaring gap in terms of poverty levels, the rural-urban and rich-poor identities have not been a source of violence. Religious cleavages have also not been a significant factor in identity politics in Zambia since the country has largely remained a Christian nation. The declaration of Zambia as a Christian nation is embellished in the Pentecostal theology that advocates for peaceful solutions to emerging societal challenges, and thus emphasis is always placed in finding spiritual remedies (Kaunda, et al. 2018). Through the efforts of the Ministry of National Guidance and Religious Affairs (MNGRA), which is mandated, among other functions, to promote inter-denominational dialogue, the significance of religious cleavages has seemingly been diluted.

2.2 Ethnic Configuration in Zambia

Zambia has a diverse mix of ethnic groups. It is estimated that there are approximately 72 ethnic groups in Zambia. These groups are distributed in the 10 administrative provinces. Of interest is the fact that none of the ethnic groups holds an absolute majority. The largest is the Bemba, which accounts for 21 percent of the population, followed by the Tonga 14 percent, the Chewa 7 percent, the Lozi 6 percent, and Nsenga 5 percent. The ethnic groups not indicated in the table have a relatively low population, therefore, they have been classified under others.

While Zambians identify themselves as members of the country's seventy-two tribes, there is also a tendency for Zambians to identify themselves as members of one of the country's four broad language communities, i.e. the Bemba-speakers, Nyanja-speakers, Tonga-speakers, and Lozi-speakers. In Zambia, ethnicity matters, and it is

believed to affect hiring decisions and promotion prospects in both the private and public sectors. Political and economic elites are believed to use their power to assist members of their ethnic communities (Posner, 2005). This has important implications for the way politics is conducted. On the one hand, voters in Zambia are inclined to support politicians from their ethnic groups over others, and on the other hand, politicians also tend to craft their electoral appeals along with the four linguistic constituencies.

Suffice to mention that politics in Zambia has primarily been dominated by the Bembas. They have in most cases carved ethnic alliances with other small ethnic groups to perpetuate their dominance, especially in the political arena. These ethnic groups have been distinguished as ethnopolitical identities (Erdmann,2007) and in successive elections, politicians have exploited them to entrench their political dominance in a quest for political power. Erdmann (2007) argues that some of the ethnic groups highlighted above are further fragmented into smaller sub-ethnic groups, if exploited, can become a distinct political identity group. These identities become more pronounced during elections.

3.0 Causes and Drivers of Identity-Based Violence

The resulting identity inclined violence being experienced in Zambia especially during electioneering can be attributed to different socio-economic and political factors as discussed below:

3.1 Ethnicization of Zambian Politics

In the wake of the democratization, a key factor accounting for the salience of ethnicity is the instrumentalization of ethnicity by political elites. Recent elections in Zambia have witnessed the manipulation of ethnicity by politicians who mobilize their followers along tribal lines. As political competition becomes stiffer in Zambia, ethnically mobilized political violence has become part of the political landscape. Violence in Zambia is more prevalent during the election period and, in some instances, the violence has had deeply rooted tribal undertones. On the other hand, cases of inter-communal violence over land, for example, have been intermittently reported in some regions.

The culture of ethnic-based violence started emerging during the 1991 elections and manifested through tribal divisions that produced deep social fragmentation and violence that led to the loss of more than 30 lives and destruction of property (Perlez, 1990). Such violence was also was widely reported in Mapatizya in Kalomo and Kalulushi districts in the Copperbelt during the 2005 by-elections. Party cadres of the United Party for National Development (UPND) adopted a violent militia-style of political activism to attack those who were considered passive as "outsiders", especially government officials. The 2006 general election was also characterized by violence and ethnic-based hate speech. At the height of these elections, for example, Sata (a presidential candidate from the Bemba ethnic group) allegedly argued that the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) under Levi Mwanawasa was suppressing the Bemba-speaking ethnic group. He further claimed that the anti-corruption crusade was selectively targeting Bemba politicians from the Northern and Luapula provinces, including the former President Chiluba. These utterances exacerbated political tension between communities during the election period and its aftermath.

Despite the proliferation of political parties after the introduction of multiparty politics in 1991, three main political parties have dominated the political landscape, they included the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD), the Patriotic Front (PF) and the United Party for National Development (UPND). As indicated below, during the 2016 elections, for instance, the country was divided into almost two halves in terms of voting patterns. The Commission of Inquiry into Voting Patterns and Electoral Violence (2019) noted in its report that tribalism and regional voting characterized the 2016 elections.

Voting patterns in the 2016 presidential election by province

No.	Provinces	UPND – Results	PF – Results
1.	North-Western	**208,414**	28,859
2.	Luapula	35,929	**205,770**
3.	Northern	63,719	**218,938**
4.	Muchinga	25,761	159,345
5.	Eastern	62,321	**299,249**
6.	Lusaka	242,172	375,760
7.	Central	177,854	138,517
8.	Copperbelt	189,562	345,275
9.	Western	**226,722**	46,255
10.	Southern	**527,893**	42,909

Source: Electoral Commission of Zambia (2016)

3.2 Political Mobilization through Violence

The use of violence as a form of political mobilization is not unique to Zambia but has become more acute since the PF came into power. The immediate-past three presidential elections in Zambia (2011, 2015, and 2016) have witnessed many incidents of ethnic-based political violence, which not only threaten to erode the country's democratic gains but also fracture her social cohesion. During the 2011 elections, for instance, political violence, hate speech, and incendiary pronouncements by political candidates were unprecedented (Mukunto, 2019). The main parties (PF, MMD, and UPND) were involved in protracted violent campaign practices that involved molestation and intimidation of political opponents, seizure of private properties, mass protest, and public disorder, vandalism and hate speech (*ibid*). The trend of the violence experienced during elections is worrying and may exacerbate ethnic antagonism leading to more large scale and mass atrocities and violence.

3.3 Leadership Contestations, Land and Boundary Issues

In June 2020, ethnic conflict erupted between the Lozi and Nyoka ethnic groups in Kaoma district, the second time the two ethnic groups were engaging in inter-communal conformation. The Nyoka is a relatively small ethnic group but opposed to being ruled by traditional leaders from the Lozi ethnic group, who dominate the western province (Inter Press Service, 2020). This conflict underscores the fact that there are underlying unresolved historical issues that trigger violence.

Land and boundary issues have also remained contentious in Zambia. Across decades, land in Zambia has been held under customary tenure, but this changed with the introduction of freehold and tenure systems. In recent times, competition and boundary disputes in both urban and rural areas have intensified, manifesting as disputes between chiefdoms, ethnic groups, families, and individuals. The disputes have in most cases been driven by increased economic activities, the increase in population, the influx of foreign nationals seeking to invest, and liberalization of land markets.

Traditional leaders have been embroiled in land disputes that have resulted in inter-communal violence. For example, the boundary disputes between Chieftainess Mwape of the Nsenga people in Nyimba District and Chief Nyamphande of Petauke District degenerated into violence where the two leaders accused each other of encroachment. In Lusaka District, cases of people encroaching and developing land which does not belong to them have been reported. In most cases, illegal encroachment has resulted in violent confrontations. From the above cases, it can be argued that as interest in land continues to grow yet becoming scarce, the likelihood for land to cause violent conflicts also increases among and between those to whom it is a source of power or livelihood. Given the fact that some ethnic communities collectively own land in specific geographical areas,

land conflicts may also become politicized to create political constituencies at the expense of certain groups leading to identity-based violence.

3.4 Unbalanced Political Representation

The political representation that is cognizant of all segments of society is important in building a cohesive society. However, the political landscape in Zambia is characterized by unequal political representation among ethnic groups or tribal communities. There is a general feeling among the population that the presidency has been dominated by people from one region. This feeling tends to foment ethnic tension among the electorate, especially during the election period. Out of the six Presidents that Zambia has had since independence, only one did not come from the North-Eastern region of the country. This has reinforced the sentiments about one regional-linguistic group dominating the political landscape in Zambia.

Related to this are the perceptions that the appointment of ministers and other senior officials have tended to be skewed in favor of the North-Eastern region. According to the Commission of Inquiry into Voting Patterns and Electoral Violence (2019), there is an emerging perception that "people from North-Western, Western and Southern province are not equitably represented in government at the level of cabinet and permanent secretary. The skewed representation of ethnic groups in government has in many instances led to resentments from a cross-section of society. After winning the elections in 2015 for example, president Lungu was accused of appointing his kinsmen into the cabinet. The appointment triggered a wave of violence in various parts of the country where the Nguni people (president Lungu's tribe) were intimidated and harassed (Habasonda, 2018). The violence leads to the death of at least 6 people and destruction of property (Lusaka Times, 12 October 2018).

3.5 Militarization of Politics

It has been observed that ruling political parties in Zambia often militarize politics using party cadres. In some cases, they have been accused of engaging in ethnic profiling and organizing attacks by the military on individuals and communities considered to support opposition political parties. The cadres are known to carry crude weapons such as machetes and some carry guns publicly. This has made them ruthless in their actions especially when dealing with political opponents and have been reported to abuse drugs thus becoming easily irritable at the slightest provocation (Namaiko and Etyang, 2020). Amidst this political turbulence, the risk of identity-based violence is exacerbated by a growing youth bulge. Zambia youthful population is much larger than compared to the elderly. According to United Nations Population Funds (2016), Zambia had 4.8 million young people aged between 15-35 (36.7 percent of the population). The growing youth population coupled with scarce opportunities for employment and access to other services have made the youth vulnerable to political manipulation, including their participation in youth-based violence and militarization to control them.

3.6 Poverty and Inequality

Other key drivers of identity-based violence are poverty, inequality, exclusion, and unequal regional and sub-regional growth in the country. In fact, in communities with existing fissures on identity lines, factors like poverty, inequality, and unemployment drive divisions between groups and communities. Despite Zambia recording a decade of impressive economic growth averaging 7.4 % per year, and subsequently achieving lower-middle-income status in 2011, this growth is not matching the reduction in poverty levels. The country is experiencing unequal, non-inclusive, jobless, and ruthless growth trends, where the growth witnessed seems to have bypassed most of the population and benefitted a few urban elites. In the past 5 years, poverty has worsened the erosion of livelihoods of ordinary people, due to the increases in food prices, especially maize, and the lay-off of mine workers. Income distribution remains skewed, with the majority earning very little while a minority makes a comfortable living.

Poverty is still widespread and is reflective of the low growth rates in agriculture, which employs the majority of the working population, and limited employment opportunities in sectors such as manufacturing and mining. According to data released by the Central Statistical Office (2018), the level of poverty at the national level was estimated at 54.4 % and is predominantly high in the rural areas estimated at 76.6% compared to 23.3% in urban areas (Central Statistical Office, 2018:32). In terms of geographical distribution, poverty levels are reported to be high in the Western province at 82.2%, followed by Luapula at 81.1%, Northern at 79.7%, and Eastern at 70% (*ibid*, 2018:31).

Massive development projects, in this case, through foreign investments occurring against the backdrop of ethnic-based fissures can increase the propensity for identity-based violence in Zambia. This is especially in the mining sector, and there are growing concerns marked by the creation of an elitist economy, worsening environmental degradation, manifest erosion of labour rights, and neglect of safety standards, which has led to calls by locals about the need to stop the mistreatment of Zambian workers. This issue has been constantly flagged by organizations such as the Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and International Crisis Group.[2]

3.7 Skewed Distribution of National Development

Successive governments in Zambia have perpetuated a culture of political and economic supremacy of a few privileged individuals and ethnic communities as a result subjugating most of the population to poverty. The distribution of state resources has been based on political support and political allegiance to the ruling party and state leaders respectively. This has created a discrepancy in terms of development across regions of the country. Some regions (where the political class come from) are mode developed as compared to others that seemingly associate with the political opposition in the country. This scenario has created a political resentment among some communities and breeds ethnic animosity against those considered politically dominant. The inequality in the distribution of resources has triggered spurts of ethnic violence in some of the regions in the country, often witnessed during elections as ethnic elites jostle for power.

3.9 Poor Governance and Corruption

Governance is a key factor that has the biggest potential to contribute to identity-based violence and mass atrocities, or their prevention. Indeed, poor governance has often been identified as one of the root causes or drivers of mass atrocities in most African countries. Rosenau (1990) argued that the narrowing competence of governments contributes to a revived sense of identity and the proliferation of subgroups in the form of ethnic groups. In many parts of the continent, poor governance characterized by endemic corruption has tended to widen the mistrust among citizens for their leaders, and in some instances, this has led to state legitimacy being questioned.

The linkages between corruption and insecurity are well noted as outcomes from failures in governance. The lack of confidence in public institutions such as the security forces and the judiciary contribute to further social distance between the public and the state. For example, a corrupt judicial system violates the fundamental right of equality before the law. In December 2018, Zambia's Supreme Court jailed a journalist for 18 months for contempt of court after he accused the judiciary of corruption.[3] The correlation between corruption and identity-based conflict is especially observable when corrupt practices such as bribery are used to subvert human rights and respect of the rule of law. There also appears to have been an erosion of public confidence in and respect for the authority of the law enforcement sector, a development that could contribute to future insecurity.

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[2] Human Rights Watch Report (2011) "You'll Be Fired if You Refuse: Labour Abuses in Zambia's Chinese State-Owned Copper Mines."
[3] "Zambian Court jails journalist for calling judiciary to account," *News 24,* 20 December 2018, https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/zambian-court-jails-journalist-for-calling-judiciary-to-account-20181220

4.0 Legal Frameworks to deal with Identity-Based Violence

The Zambian government has been slow to develop legal and policy frameworks to manage identity-based conflicts and violence, neither has the government developed robust conflict management and violence mitigating tools. Some of the key frameworks that require review and amendments include the Zambian constitution, the Electoral process Act 2016, the Public Order Act, the Constituency Development Fund Act, etc. In terms of societal cleavages, there has not been a clear legislative move to foster improvements in the economic conditions of marginalized groups and functionally incorporate them into mainstream politics or economic agendas. Instead, inequalities persist, and tensions have risen during election times over grievances that are never adequately addressed legally.

5.0 Policy Frameworks and Programs to deal with Identity-Based Violence

The government took steps to develop policy frameworks to deal with some of the conflict influencing factors discussed above, including:

5.1 Vision 2030 - Policy Document

The Vision aims to improve the public financial management system and to boost the delivery of public services. It is founded on seven key basic principles: (i) sustainable development; (ii) upholding democratic principles; (iii) respect for human rights; (iv) fostering family values; (v) a positive attitude to work; (vi) peaceful coexistence; and (vii) upholding good traditional values. While the policy vision recognizes peaceful coexistence, it does not explicitly discuss how this is to be achieved in the long-term. The policy plan does not for example outline the structures and mechanisms required to guarantee peaceful coexistence among the different ethnic groups. Also, it lacks a proper monitoring and evaluation framework that can be used to measure key milestones achieved, more specifically in the promotion of peace.

5.2 Public Welfare Assistance Scheme (PWAS)

The scheme is being implemented by the government and involves social assistance programs aimed at mitigating social-economic shocks and other negative effects such as poverty and other vagaries brought about by the spread of HIV and AIDS. Its objectives include promoting community capacity to develop the local and externally supported capacity to overcome the problems of extreme poverty and vulnerability and to assist vulnerable groups in society to fulfill basic needs, particularly health, education, food, and shelter. PWAS has huge potential to assuage the economic drivers of violence and to curtail the feelings of relative deprivation among many sectors of the population in Zambia. However, the implementation of the program has faced many challenges including limited funding, limited geographical scope, and many households, especially in marginalized rural areas have not been enrolled in the program.

5.3 Peace Pledges

Albeit *ad hoc*, another strategy that has been advanced to deal with identity-based violence is the use of peace pledges. In 2019, the Patriotic Front (PF) Party and the United Party for National Development (UPND), pledged to maintain peace through a joint communique. Signed by party representatives, the police, and the district electoral officer, the 10-point plan was a commitment to end violence during future elections across the country. The peace pledge was supervised by the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ). It is envisaged that the institutionalization of peace pledges could become of the strategies that can prevent electoral-based and political violence.

6.0 Policy and Practice Recommendations

Based on the above discussion, the following recommendations are made to be considered by policymakers and policy implementing communities to be able to contribute to the prevention of identity-based violence in the country:

The Government of Zambia

- *Need to link peacebuilding agenda to broader development plans:* While the Vision 2030 recognizes the centrality of national cohesion in societal development, it does not provide a framework on how this is to be achieved. The Vision 2030 plan should have an explicit pillar for promoting peaceful coexistence among different ethnic communities. A peacebuilding and violence prevention agenda should be adopted and embellished into national development plans.

- *Establishing and maintaining a national peace architecture*: Zambia's government should develop a peace-building policy that will establish a peace architecture that is cascaded to the grassroots communities. The policy framework should harness the support from civil society organization, religious and cultural institutions and communities, elders, youth and women, among other groups;

- *Improve management of the Electoral process*: The government should outlaw and discourage ethnicization of political parties, electoral and other processes through which citizens participate in leadership and governance. The amendment of the Electoral Act should also seek to strengthen the existing national and community level mechanisms and organizations for peacebuilding. Also, establish and strengthen the capacity of the Conflict Management Committees to deal with identity-based grievances and violence. This can include entrenching their conflict management and prevention mandates in the Constitution of Zambia and other relevant policy, legal and programming frameworks;

- *Outlawing politicization of ethnicity*: The government should mitigate against the risk of political manipulation of tribal and linguistic identities by outlawing the ethnicization of politics and the politicization of ethnicity. This can be done through strengthening the legal framework that seeks to promote a national outlook of political parties and processes, including elections.

- *Developing a peace education agenda*: The Zambian government should strengthen the institutionalization of peace education in the national educational curricula as a social cohesion strategy. Peace education should be mandatory and offered through both formal and informal education, focused on the promotion of pro-social values of tolerance, inclusivity, and diversity at all levels of society.

- *Promote inclusive approaches to peacebuilding and Identity-based violence prevention*: Women and youth should actively participate in social, political, economic, cultural, and traditional processes and access the same opportunities alongside their male counterparts. Research has consistently revealed that states characterized by higher levels of gender equality are less likely to experience inter-communal and intrastate conflict. Gender equality is an essential factor in a country's security and stability. The government should promote greater participation and the role of youth and women in peacebuilding and social cohesion. This operationally entails putting gender equality at the heart of peace-building and social cohesion and to incorporate greater women's participation in the peace-building and social cohesion agenda of Zambia.

- *Supporting sustainable, accountable, and broad-based development:* Government and foreign investors should support and promote local participation and community empowerment, through a broad-based framework that guarantees equal opportunities and access to resources. As part of a broad-based approach to preventing identity-based local conflicts, the government should support the small to medium enterprises that are within the means of poorly resourced women and youth groups to establish and manage.

- *Diversification of the Zambian economy*: The government should put in place measures that would prevent economic-driven frustrations from becoming peace and security threats. To this end, there is a need for sustained efforts to diversify the economy to deal with risk factors for identity-based violence. The government should consider strengthening vital sectors of the economy including agriculture, infrastructure development, tourism, and manufacturing as it forges ahead with the diversification agenda. The Zambia Development Agency (ZDA), should for example consider incentives for investors in key priority areas such as the agricultural, tourism, energy, infrastructure, manufacturing, and mining sectors.

- *Mainstreaming identity-based violence prevention*: whole-of-government guidelines should be developed to guide "mainstreaming" of identity-based violence prevention within state programs and activities. The guidelines should reflect multi-disciplinary and cross-sectoral stakeholder participation in prioritizing and working towards identity-based violence prevention. Formal mechanisms should be established with clear coordination channels linking policies, programs, and actions of government at national and community levels.

- *National center for identity-based violence prevention:* Given the multi-ethnic nature of the Zambian society, identities will forever be a factor in the governance of the country. A national center for the prevention of identity-based violence should be established to undertake high-quality research to support the development and implementation of prevention agendas, including supporting conflict-sensitive political party manifestos, legal and security sector reforms, electioneering, national and local government budgeting, and development plans, among others. The center should receive direct violence prevention resources to implement strategies that demonstrate effectiveness in redressing identify-based risk factors, strengthening of communities, families, and individuals, and engaging cultural norms that appear to support identity-based conflicts.

- *Reduction of income inequalities:* The Vision 2030 policy guidelines and related national planning documents, including the Public Welfare Assistance Scheme Programmes should prioritize eradication of systemic and enduring income inequalities across regions of Zambia. Policy and legal instruments in the country should explicitly promote identity-based violence prevention programs with sufficient resource allocations as a key aspect of the broader national plan of action. Policies are critical in responding to inequalities and improve equality and equity in accessing opportunities, services, and resources, and to address threats and risk factors for identity-based violence in Zambia.

Political Parties

- *Political party dialogues:* Political parties have a role to play in preventing, resolving, and mitigating identity-based violence. This can be undertaken through strengthening and supporting interactions of different political groups and promoting tolerance through dialogue and the signing of peace pledges. Peace pledges signed by political parties in most cases demonstrate a commitment to uphold peace before, during, and after the elections. They can be considered as covenants and social contracts not only between political parties but also between them and the people of Zambia. Peace pledges provide a demonstration that political parties and leaders are accountable to the citizens, and they remind political actors to prioritize peace and tolerance.

- *The leadership role of political parties:* It Is crucial for political parties, who are the centerpiece of electoral democracy to play a leadership role by engaging in constructive internal processes that stand the test of constitutionalism, rule of law, respect for human rights and inclusivity. When political parties adopt such a

stance, the rest of the Zambian populace who are attracted by their respective ideals will internalize this behavior, towards a just and peaceful society.

- *Creating platforms for party supporters and carders to engage*: Political leaders can socialize their supporters to focus on ideology and policy issues during campaigns. This can be done through creating the space for youth, women, and other ordinary party associates to civilly engage with their party leaders. The main political parties, UPND and PF, especially senior party members should socialize the lower-ranking members to embrace building peaceful coexistence, social-bonding, and strong relationships as necessary conditions for local peace. The socialization of party members should include young party cadres who continue to bear responsibility for the violence during elections.

- *De-militarization of politics*: The use of violence and militarization of politics to achieve political objectives should be outlawed to avoid further fracturing of society in Zambia. The militant demeanor of Zambian political behavior, especially by party cadres in defending their positions, has the effect of closing doors on dialogue and integrative bargaining in politics. Against this background, it is imperative to change the moral, political and social campus of the Zambian society, to move towards more tolerant politics where violence should not be the *de-facto* means of expressing dissent or competition.

Development Partners and the Civil Society

- Multi-track diplomacy underscores the important role played by various tracks of actors or sectors in the pursuit and maintenance of peace. These tracks include officials in government and political figures, security actors, civil society organizations, development partners, business sector, traditional leaders, religious leaders, women's organizations, youths, researchers, think tanks and academia, eminent persons, as well as the media. The following recommendations are geared towards such actors to play their role in preventing, resolving, and mitigating identity-based violence in Zambia.

- *Promoting Civic Education and Awareness Raising about Prevention*: Develop and promote policies and programs to increase knowledge or public awareness about issues, processes, and mandates of actors to counter threats and build opportunities for the prevention of identity-based violence in all its forms. Such information should highlight national and community-level rights, roles, and responsibilities of everyone towards effective prevention. Development partners should continue working closely with key stakeholders to this end, such as the parliament, religious and cultural institutions, and civil society organizations, to strengthen capacity and institutional building programs.

- *Using everyday forms of bridge-building*: Prevention of identity-based violence requires the utilization of everyday forms of peacebuilding, to function as constant reminders and reinforcements to existing programs. A very big opportunity that exists in Zambia is its religious nature as a country. Religious leaders must continue adopting positive political theologies to encourage and promote peacefulness and good neighborliness among followers.

- *Conflict-sensitive media engagement strategy*: The media has a role to play in ensuring prevention or mitigation of identity-based violence. Zambian citizens, just like in many other countries, rely on all forms of media (social, electronic, and traditional media) as sources of information. However, there is a tendency for the population to fall prey to biased and conflict-insensitive reporting capable of inciting violence, often presented as news, commentaries, or documentaries. Media regulatory policies and provisions for management and programming should support positive and educational reporting, reconciliation towards social, economic, and political issues, and create opportunities for citizens to consider and value nonviolent responses when challenged with adversity.

- *Promote tolerance, inclusion, and diversity:* FBOs, CSOs, and CBOs in Zambia, including women's groups and youth organizations should work toward supporting capacity development efforts to promote the reduction of identity-based violence. This can be done through community dialogues, training, and peace education processes to promote pro-social values, resilience, and strong positive relationships that counter the appeal to use violence in the spirit of "One Zambia one Nation."

- *Early Warning and Early Response Systems.* Develop institutional capacity for ongoing monitoring of risks and threats, and audit existing policy and legal frameworks, through systematic information gathering and sharing towards early warning and early response to prevent identity-based violence. Such information generated from analysis and interpretation of the data collected can support the formulation and monitoring of the impact of related policies and increase awareness about risks, protective factors, and appropriate preventive measures at national and community levels.

7.0 Final Remark

These recommendations and subsequent policies generated towards IBV prevention in Zambia will be best achieved with the establishment and support of a national committee for the prevention of genocide and mass atrocities including identity-based violence. Zambia is already a member of the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) and therefore a signatory to the Pact on Security, Stability, and Development. One of the ten protocols of the Pact is the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, War Crimes, and Crimes Against Humanity and all forms of Discrimination. The protocol mandates all member states to establish a regional committee and subsequently national committees to implement the functions contained therein which resonate with the recommendations provided above. To this extent, a National Committee would be appropriate not only to facilitate the implementation of the above policy recommendations and practices but also to link National strategies and programs with similar National Committees in the Great Lakes region.

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